Distinguished Chair, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is a great honor to address this distinguished forum at a time when our region stands at a critical crossroads in its pursuit of sustainable connectivity and inclusive economic development. I extend my sincere appreciation to the Institute of Regional Studies and Ambassador Jauhar Saleem for convening this timely and strategically significant dialogue.
On behalf of the International Institute for Central Asia, I wish to underscore a central imperative for our region—the diversification of trade and transit routes through closer and more effective cooperation with our southern neighbors, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
Central Asia’s geography is both a strategic asset and a longstanding constraint. As landlocked states situated at the heart of the Eurasian continent, we possess immense potential to serve as a vital bridge linking East and West, North and South. Yet, historically, our infrastructure and trade flows have been disproportionately oriented northward—shaped by inertia and inherited infrastructure and limited alternatives.
Today, a rapidly shifting realities—marked by evolving security challenges, sanctions, and logistical vulnerabilities—demands a fundamental rethinking of our connectivity strategies.
In this context, the diversification of trade corridors is not merely a policy option—it is a strategic necessity for building more resilient, sovereign, and future-ready economies.
Allow me to highlight three key corridors that offer transformative potential to reconfigure the logistics landscape of Central Asia and unlock new economic horizons:
The first corridor is the North–South Transport Corridor (NSTC).
The NSTC, anchored through Iran, represents one of the most mature, cost-effective, and operationally viable multi-modal trade routes available to Central Asian economies. Since 2016, the trans-Iranian railway—stretching from Sarakhs on the Turkmenistan border to the port of Bandar Abbas—has provided direct access to the Persian Gulf, re-establishing a long-disrupted historical link.
With the near completion of the Sarakhs–Chabahar railway and the continued expansion of Iran’s road and rail networks, the country is increasingly well-positioned to function as a strategic multi-modal hub—connecting Central Asia with key markets across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
In this regard, the development of the Chabahar Port, supported by international partners, is especially significant. It offers a reliable and resilient maritime outlet—independent of traditional chokepoints—for Central Asian exports and imports.
These efforts are institutionalized through the Ashgabat Agreement, a multilateral platform involving Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Oman. Together with the NSTC, it forms the backbone of a southward logistics axis—an integrated gateway to India, the Gulf, and beyond.
Moreover, Iran’s highway network facilitates road transit from Sarakhs to Bandar Abbas or Chabahar in under 7 days—a significant advantage for time-sensitive freight and perishable goods.
Second, the Trans-Afghan Corridor: Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan
Perhaps the boldest and most transformational initiative currently under consideration is the Trans-Afghan Corridor. This proposed 573-kilometer railway, connecting Termez to Mazar-i-Sharif, Kabul, and ultimately Peshawar, envisions a seamless land bridge between Central Asia and the Pakistani ports of Karachi and Gwadar.
This $7 billion project enjoys strong political backing from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and, I strongly believe, Pakistan, and has attracted interest from stakeholders such as Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. The implementation of this project will reduce the cost of delivery almost threefold- from $900 to $286, and the travel time – from 35 to 3-5 days. Estimates also suggest it could reduce transportation costs to and from Indian Ocean ports by 30–40%, with annual freight volumes reaching 22 million tons by 2030 and 34 million tons by 2040. Afghanistan is expected to handle over 20% of this cargo, bolstering its economic integration with the region.
We are fully aware of the operational risks—especially those related to security, regulatory harmonization, and institutional capacity. Yet we remain convinced that infrastructure must be seen as a precondition for peace, not merely its reward. Investing in regional connectivity through Afghanistan is a strategic decision to integrate rather than isolate.
Importantly, we must not overlook the existing road networks that already underpin this corridor. The 2,800-kilometer Tashkent–Termez–Kabul–Peshawar–Karachi highway currently serves as the most cost-effective land route, with delivery times ranging from 7 to 10 days.
In February, I had the opportunity to visit the Port of Karachi. What I observed reaffirmed its vast potential—not only for Pakistan but for the entire region. With its advanced container-handling facilities, expansive storage capacity, and well-integrated inland transport networks, Karachi has the capacity to serve as a pivotal maritime gateway for Central Asia.
Deepening connectivity with Karachi—via both the Trans-Afghan transport Corridor and complementary rail links—will dramatically improve our access to global markets and reduce logistics costs.
The 2024 trilateral agreement between Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and the UAE to conduct a feasibility study marks a critical milestone. Once implemented, this corridor could reduce freight transit times between Central and South Asia by 30 to 50 percent and significantly lower transport costs—especially for bulk and industrial shipments.
Beyond freight, this corridor holds potential for cross-border energy and electricity transmission infrastructure—laying the foundation for a broader regional transformation.
Third, the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) Railway
The CKU Railway, launched in December 2024, connects Andijan (Uzbekistan) to Kashgar (China) via Torugart Pass (Kyrgyzstan). Spanning 523 kilometers, this railway serves as a strategic connector to the $46 billion China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), enhancing access to the Arabian Sea through Pakistan’s deep-sea ports.
This corridor complements—not competes with—the NSTC and Trans-Afghan routes. It intersects east-west and north-south flows, embedding Central Asia more deeply into Belt and Road trade dynamics. Once the CKU railway reaches full operational capacity, it will offer a viable route for containerized and industrial freight headed to Chinese markets or onward to Southeast Asia.
Parallel to the railway, an existing highway route runs Andijan–Osh–Torugart–Kashgar–Khunjerab–Rawalpindi–Karachi, totaling nearly 3,855 km. However, the Khunjerab Pass (4,693 meters elevation) is mostly closed from November to March, making this corridor seasonally limited. This seasonal vulnerability highlights the need for rail redundancy and weather-resilient infrastructure.
Both the Trans-Afghan Corridor and the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan will allow Central Asia to get access to South Asia with population of 2 billion and total GDP $3.4 trillion.
For instance, bilateral trade has grown $36.5 million in 2017 to more than $ 400 million in 2024. During the visit of Pakistani Prime minister Shahbaz Sharif to Uzbekistan in February 2025, two sides agreed to increase these figures to $ 2billion.
Despite the promise these corridors offer, several systemic challenges must be addressed:
First, fragmented customs and border procedures
Solution: Central Asian countries, Iran, and Pakistan must prioritize regional digital customs harmonization using platforms like the e-TIR and e-CMR systems. Bilateral and trilateral memoranda on data sharing and mutual recognition of standards are essential.
Second, security and risk perception—especially in Afghanistan
Solution: Multilateral risk insurance mechanisms—backed by institutions such as the Islamic Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), or World Bank’s MIGA—can lower investment barriers. Simultaneously, stakeholder states should establish joint corridor security task forces in collaboration with local communities.
Third, weak infrastructure maintenance and financing gaps
Solution: Launch targeted public–private infrastructure investment funds with blended finance models that combine state support, sovereign wealth fund capital, and venture-backed logistics startups. Engage the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and ASEAN as financial partners.
Fourth. absence of coordinated corridor governance
Solution: Establish Corridor Coordination Councils under rotating leadership, modeled on ASEAN's institutional frameworks. These would oversee technical harmonization, investment promotion, dispute resolution, and emergency response coordination.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
At the International Institute for Central Asia, we are committed to fostering dialogue, advancing research, and building partnerships that transform connectivity into cooperation—and cooperation into shared prosperity.
Iran and Pakistan are not merely neighbors; they are indispensable partners in our regional integration efforts. Each offers unique gateways, complementary strengths, and shared aspirations.
However, infrastructure alone is not enough. For these corridors to become operational and impactful, we need to pursue policy harmonization, streamline customs procedures, establish risk insurance mechanisms, and foster public–private partnerships across borders.
We call on our counterparts in regional and global institutions—as well as our partners in the private sector—to support these initiatives not only as transportation projects, but as strategic platforms for peace, resilience, and inclusive development.
Together, let us chart a course toward a more connected, competitive, and cooperative Eurasia.
Thank you.