Distinguished guests, colleagues,

It is a pleasure to join you today to discuss one of the most consequential opportunities and challenges facing both Central Asia and the international community: critical minerals and the green transition. As the global economy pivots toward decarbonization, critical minerals—lithium, copper, rare earth elements, cobalt, uranium—are emerging as the new strategic resources. Their significance is now comparable to oil and gas in earlier decades. These materials are essential to renewable energy systems, electric vehicles, semiconductors, defense platforms, and clean grid technologies. The control of their supply chains will help define the geopolitical and economic order of the 21st century.

We are gathered here at a moment of profound change. The COP28 summit was a milestone, signaling the beginning of the end of the fossil fuel era. But it also revealed the early contours of a new competition—a scramble for the minerals that will drive the green economy. The demand is staggering. The International Energy Agency estimates that mineral requirements for clean energy technologies must quadruple by 2040 to meet Paris Agreement targets. Demand for nickel and cobalt will rise by 60–70%, copper and rare earths by 40%, and uranium demand could double.

1. Competition or Cooperation?

This leads to a critical question: are we heading toward greater collaboration or sharper competition among international partners in the pursuit of these resources?

There are signs of both. On one hand, we see efforts at coordination: the United States and its G7 allies have launched the Minerals Security Partnership and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), designed to diversify supply chains and reduce dependence on single sources. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the deep asymmetries and rivalries. China today controls 60% of global critical mineral production and 85% of processing. Even when minerals are mined outside of China, they are often refined and processed there. The U.S., by contrast, imports three-quarters of its rare earth elements from China and is reliant on imports for over half of its overall critical mineral needs.

So, while we may see more talk of collaboration, competition—especially over influence, infrastructure, and access—will likely intensify. Central Asia is at the center of this new geopolitical landscape.

1. Central Asia’s Strategic Role

The region is extraordinarily well positioned. Central Asia collectively holds:

• 6% of global manganese reserves,
• 30% of chromium,
• 20% of lead,
• 6% of zinc,
• and significant quantities of lithium, rare earths, and uranium.

Kazakhstan alone supplied 43% of global uranium in 2022. Uzbekistan boasts significant lithium and rare earth reserves, yet only a fraction of its territory has been surveyed with modern geological techniques.

Interest from outside powers has surged. Chinese investment in the region grew from $40 billion in 2020 to over $70 billion in 2022. China is already the primary destination for most of the region’s critical mineral exports, facilitated by proximity, existing trade infrastructure, and early commercial engagement. In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Chinese firms control most mining licenses. Russia, while still influential, is increasingly outpaced economically.

This rising interest sets up an important inflection point. Will Central Asia be a passive supplier of raw materials, or will it develop the capacity to retain more value—through processing, manufacturing, and innovation?

III. How Will This Shape the Region in the Next Five Years?

Over the next five years, the scramble for critical minerals will shape Central Asia in at least three major ways:

1. Economic Transformation: The shift from hydrocarbons to minerals is already changing the region’s economic landscape. In 2020, Kazakh copper exports surpassed natural gas revenue. In Tajikistan, critical minerals made up 37% of exports in 2019. For Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the share now exceeds 10%. If managed wisely, this could lead to diversification, industrialization, and job creation.
2. Governance and Reform Pressures: As mineral revenues grow, so too will scrutiny over governance. Investment will increasingly be tied to transparency, ESG standards, and respect for labor and environmental rights. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are reforming their mining codes and expressing interest in standards such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). This is a critical juncture—either the region moves toward cleaner, more accountable growth, or it risks replicating the extractive, rent-seeking models of the oil and gas era.
3. Strategic Realignment: Growing international engagement—particularly from the U.S., EU, and China—will reshape the region’s geopolitical posture. This could provide leverage for Central Asian governments to pursue more autonomous, balanced foreign policies. But it also risks increasing competition and asymmetry, especially where investment is tied to strategic influence.
4. The Role of Infrastructure and Investment

Which brings us to a final question: will investment in infrastructure and capacity continue, decline, or accelerate?

In my view, it must accelerate—but it will depend on how well regional governments and international partners can align on mutual priorities. Connectivity remains a major obstacle. Transport routes like the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) is promising, but underdeveloped. Customs, rail, energy, and digital infrastructure still lag. Without these, the region cannot meaningfully participate in higher stages of the value chain.

Furthermore, extraction is only the first step. Processing, refining, and manufacturing must follow. That requires technology, financing, and skills. The U.S. Geological Survey could support more detailed mapping of mineral reserves. U.S. universities and companies could contribute training, expertise, and innovation. Financial tools—like risk guarantees, blended finance, and public-private partnerships—will be needed to crowd in Western capital.

Above all, what’s required is trust and long-term partnership. If Central Asia is to move beyond the “dig and ship” model, it will need to embed mineral extraction into broader industrial policy, workforce development, and green innovation.

Conclusion: A New Framework for Engagement

So, to return to the questions posed:

- Will we see more collaboration or competition? Likely both. But proactive coordination can turn competition into productive pluralism—if the international community engages transparently and responsibly.

- How will critical minerals shape the region? Profoundly. The next five years will define whether the region becomes a processing and manufacturing hub, or remains a source of raw materials.

- Will investment accelerate? It must. But this depends on building the enabling environment: governance reforms, infrastructure, and regional cooperation.

The proposed C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue, if well designed, can be a platform to integrate all these elements—government coordination, private investment, ESG standards, and technological exchange.

Let us seize this opportunity to build a new model of mineral development—one that advances energy security, economic resilience, and shared prosperity.

Thank you.