The world around us is changing—this is no secret; it is undeniable and visible to all. We see it in the growing risks to maritime trade routes, in the continuing instability in Eastern Europe, and global trade wars. We witness the rising importance of the Middle Corridor, the expanding influence of China, and the global hunt for critical minerals. Together, these dynamics are placing Central Asia firmly in the global spotlight, highlighting the region’s increasing relevance and the opportunities it presents for international cooperation
We now see the importance of centripetal forces—forces that bring us together and strengthen our cooperation and shared identity. We are working to become a more united region, with a common vision, complementary economies, and connected infrastructure. By coming together, we can better face global challenges, engage with international partners on equal terms, ensure our stability, and gain many economic and strategic benefits. We are now making coordinated statements at the UN, representing not only a particular country, but the whole region. As a region, Central Asia is a strong force, with a combined GDP of over 520 billion dollars and a market of 85 million people. Not speaking of abundant oil and gas reserves and critical minerals. This is
These global shifts are forcing many to pick sides. But Central Asia remains firm. Every country in our region understands the importance of a multivector foreign policy. That is why we have established eleven C5+1 platforms, involving more than 40 countries and two regional organizations. Because we do not pick sides, we choose everyone—and this approach has proven highly beneficial for our region.
This year, in particular, has been remarkable—a year rich in C5+ summits and international engagements. In March, the first-ever EU–Central Asia Summit took place in Samarkand, where the European Union announced a landmark €12 billion investment package aimed at advancing transport infrastructure, enhancing digital connectivity, and promoting sustainable growth across Central Asia. Over the past seven years, trade turnover between Central Asian countries and the EU has quadrupled, reaching 54 billion euros. The EU has also been the largest investor in the region, contributing over 100 billion euros over the past decade—nearly 40 percent of all foreign investment in Central Asia.
In June, Astana hosted the Second Central Asia–China Summit. China has long been a major investor and trade partner in the region, with cumulative investments exceeding $30 billion and trade turnover nearing $100 billion. China is actively implementing mega-projects across Central Asia, including the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, pipelines, power plants, and a strong presence in the renewable energy sector.
October saw the Second Central Asia–Russia Summit in Dushanbe. Trade with Russia surpassed $45 billion over the past year, while Russian investments now exceed $20 billion. Many of our citizens reside and work in Russia, sending back vital remittances that support our economies.
There is also the Central Asia–GCC Summit, initially scheduled for April this year, but postponed due to President Trump’s visit to the Middle East. Investments from Gulf Cooperation Council countries in Central Asia have nearly tripled since 2022 and are now challenging China’s presence in the region. Financial cooperation is expanding as well, particularly through Islamic finance. The Islamic Development Bank alone has invested $9.1 billion across CIS countries, with around 60 percent directed to Central Asia.
With the United States, the numbers are smaller—around $7 billion—but they are steadily growing. The U.S. has contributed over $9 billion in direct assistance to Central Asia, including humanitarian support, and has mobilized international financial institutions to provide more than $50 billion in credit, loans, and technical assistance, fostering long-term development. We expect the upcoming C5+1 summit in Washington, D.C., to further strengthen trade relations and result in the signing of important agreements. Some major deals under the Trump administration have already been concluded, including Kazakhstan’s $4.2 billion locomotive deal with U.S.-based Wabtec, and Uzbekistan’s $8 billion purchase of 22 Boeing aircraft announced during the 2025 UN General Assembly.
As you see, the numbers speak for themselves. This is the tangible benefit of our multivector foreign policy. By not picking sides, we remain open to all partners, strengthen our regional position, and navigate these complex geopolitical shifts with confidence. This principle—choosing everyone—is the cornerstone of Central Asia’s engagement with major powers today.
C5+1, which began as a political dialogue, now has the potential to evolve into a more practical platform, addressing a wide range of fields. But it is crucial for us to be clear about what exactly we expect and need from the C5+1 framework with the United States.
First, I want to return to my earlier point about our multi-vector foreign policy. As we engage with all major powers around the world, it is essential to have a strong framework for cooperation with the United States. The U.S. is the world’s number one economy, with a presence in nearly every region, cutting-edge technologies, vast investment opportunities, and a massive market. Of course, there are many other aspects of U.S. power, but I don’t need to list them all—you already understand its global influence. Given this, there should be no question why Central Asia engages with the United States through the C5+1 platform.
Second, transport and logistics. Let me share our vision for the future of Central Asia. By 2030, we aim to remove the remaining trade barriers and digitalize the transport sector through a unified digital corridor. By 2040, we plan to harmonize legal frameworks across the region and complete a fully integrated transport corridor connecting all five capitals. By 2050, Central Asia aspires to become a major transport and logistics hub—a regional free trade center linking the Indo-Pacific with Europe.
Achieving this ambitious vision will require U.S. support—not only in terms of expertise, digitalization, and infrastructure, but also in helping shift the geopolitical landscape and facilitate trade routes. A recent example is the peace agreement signed by the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia here in Washington, D.C., at the White House. This agreement lays the groundwork for greater regional connectivity, helping Central Asia, particularly Uzbekistan, move from being landlocked to fully connected with global trade networks.
Third, trade. As I mentioned, our trade relations with the U.S. are still limited, much more so than with other international partners. Currently, we do not have Permanent Normal Trade Relations with the U.S., because the Jackson‑Vanik Amendment still applies. Achieving this status would give us access to the U.S. market of 350 million people. While this alone won’t automatically boost trade—since factors like geography and logistics also play a role—it would make a significant difference by reducing bureaucratic hurdles and simplifying documentation. The Amendment also limits investor confidence, making it harder for businesses to commit to long-term investments in the region.
Fourth, critical minerals. Central Asia holds vast reserves that are essential for the technologies of the future, yet much of this potential remains underutilized by the West. The current U.S. administration has recognized the strategic importance of critical minerals, making them a top foreign policy priority through executive orders and new partnerships with countries such as Ukraine, Malaysia, and Thailand. These efforts aim to diversify global supply chains and reduce dependence on China, which currently controls around 60 percent of production and nearly 90 percent of processing.
We look to Washington not only for investment, but also for technology transfer, infrastructure support, and a genuine alternative. The United States has a unique comparative advantage in emphasizing transparency, local capacity-building, and shared growth—qualities the region deeply values. That is exactly what we need.
The tools to make this happen are already in place. The C5+1 framework can track progress and ensure accountability. U.S. institutions such as the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) can provide financing and manage risk. Programs from the Departments of State and Commerce can support standards, procurement integrity, and traceable supply chains, while U.S. universities and research labs can provide training in mine safety, metallurgy, and standards verification.
