Esteemed Fyodor Genrikhovich,

Esteemed Sergei Nikolaevich,

Esteemed colleagues and participants of the Forum,

First of all, I would like to thank the organizers for the invitation to take part in the discussion devoted to the future of Eurasian security.

The theme of today's session could hardly be more timely. We are living through a period of profound change in the international political system, in which the established mechanisms for regulating relations between states are ceasing to function — bringing questions of regional and global security sharply into focus.

Our very understanding of security is changing as well. It can no longer be confined to the military and political domain. Economic resilience, technological development, information security, the reliability of transport and logistics links, the management of demographic processes, and the capacity of states to adapt to a transformed international environment are all acquiring growing weight.

When we speak of the future of security in Eurasia, therefore, we are speaking not only about the prevention of conflict, but about creating the conditions for sustainable development.

Esteemed experts,

Against the backdrop of turbulence in the world, Central Asia today is demonstrating its distinctiveness, becoming one of the most stable regions across the whole of Eurasia. And this is not an accident, but the result of the purposeful policy of the states of the region, which has been consistently observable since 2017.

Thanks to the open and trust-based dialogue of the leaders of the region's countries and to joint practical efforts aimed at strengthening and expanding intraregional relations, a "New Central Asia" is taking shape — a single region with common goals, tasks, and priorities.

It is important to emphasise that it is not only we ourselves who speak of these changes. They are also recorded by our dialogue partners, including representatives of the expert communities of Russia and of the majority of participants at this distinguished forum.

Thanks to the political will of the region's countries, cooperation between the states of Central Asia has become more systematic and institutionalised, which creates the conditions for the further strengthening of connectivity and for joint movement towards genuine integration.

A key role in this process is played by the mechanism of the Consultative Meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia. A vivid confirmation of this positive dynamic may be found in the outcomes of the Seventh Consultative Meeting, held in Tashkent last year. Today their results may be characterised as historic, and the established format of interaction itself as in demand, distinctive in its own way, and effective.

Among the breakthrough decisions that will shape the algorithms of our future development, mention should be made of Azerbaijan's accession to the Consultative Meetings format as a full participant.

At the same time, Tashkent saw discussion of steps towards the institutionalisation of the format, including questions of establishing a "Central Asian Community", strengthening the treaty and legal framework, instituting a rotating Secretariat and a Council of Elders, and implementing joint projects in the economy, investment, and the digital and infrastructure spheres.

It is important to note that throughout all nine years of regional interaction, all participants in this format have attached paramount importance to questions of ensuring security.

Over the years of close interaction, the countries of the region have managed not only to remove most of the problematic and acutely contentious issues that long complicated their relations, but also to build consistently their own model of regional stability, based on trust, mutual regard for interests, and shared responsibility for the future of the region.

I believe that the quintessence of such purpose and of the interest in expanding cooperation should be seen in the outcomes of last year's March summit of the leaders of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan in the city of Khujand, and in the signing, as its result, of the Treaty on the Junction Point of the State Borders and the Khujand Declaration of Eternal Friendship.

These documents marked the completion of a long period of mutual mistrust and territorial disputes in one of the most explosive and conflict-prone regions of the world, as many experts had noted — a region where, regrettably, there had already been numerous human casualties.

The countries of Central Asia have demonstrated in practice their understanding of the principles of the indivisibility of security and of the importance of ensuring stability in the region as the principal source of resilience and development.

Today this approach likewise remains the main priority, contributing to the consistent strengthening of mechanisms of interaction in the sphere of security. Here it is important to mention the regular character of the meetings of the secretaries of the security councils of the states of Central Asia, the development of cooperation between special services and law enforcement bodies, and the conduct of joint military exercises ("Birlik").

Following last year's Consultative Meeting in Tashkent, the Concept of Regional Security and Stability of Central Asia was adopted, as well as the Catalogue of Security Risks for 2026–2028. These documents for the first time set down a common vision of the key threats and of the mechanisms for responding to them, including questions of terrorism, extremism, cross-border crime, and water and energy security. Their adoption confirmed once again the gradual transition of the region's states from situational interaction to the formation of elements of their own regional security architecture.

I believe that the development of regional formats of cooperation is not directed against anyone and does not substitute for other mechanisms of interaction. On the contrary, it contributes to maintaining a more balanced regional environment, reducing the risks of confrontation, and strengthening security in the Eurasian space.

By 2035, the formats of regional cooperation created in Central Asia in recent years will likely become deeper, more institutionalized, and more practice-oriented. Strengthened coordination is to be expected in the spheres of security, transport connectivity, economic resilience, border management, and water and energy cooperation, as well as in interaction with key external partners.

At the same time, firm adherence to the consistent foreign policy line of Uzbekistan will be of fundamental importance. The country's non-aligned policy, enshrined in the 2012 Concept of Foreign Policy Activity, will remain one of the key principles of foreign policy over the coming decade. It presupposes the rejection of the stationing of foreign military bases, of participation in military-political blocs, and of involvement in military operations abroad, while at the same time preserving opportunities for the development of practical and mutually beneficial cooperation in the sphere of security with foreign partners.

Esteemed colleagues,

Separately in this connection, I would like to speak of the approaches of the region's countries to Afghanistan — as an integral part of the common security space of Central Asia.

Today Afghanistan is no longer regarded as a source of potential threats. It is now assigned the role of a key link in ensuring regional security and connectivity with South Asia, as well as in ensuring the sustainable development of the Eurasian space.

I would note that this vision is today shared by all states of the region. In particular, Uzbekistan has since 2017 consistently pursued a pragmatic course towards developing constructive interaction with Afghanistan. As the President of Uzbekistan has repeatedly emphasized, Afghanistan must be regarded as a space of new opportunities.

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have removed the Taliban movement from their national lists of terrorist organizations. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan consistently adhere to a pragmatic course oriented towards the development of practical cooperation with Kabul. Even Tajikistan, which after 2021 held a more cautious position, has gradually adapted its policy to the new regional realities. It is telling that the Russian Federation was the first among major states to officially recognize the current authorities of Afghanistan.

In this connection, mechanisms of regional interaction on the Afghan track acquire particular significance. In recent years, a practice has taken shape of regular consultations of the special representatives of the states of Central Asia on Afghanistan, which serve as a platform for exchanging assessments, coordinating approaches, and discussing questions of regional security.

At the same time, discussion is underway at various levels on resuming the activity of the SCO–Afghanistan Contact Group, which has traditionally been regarded as one of the key mechanisms for involving Afghanistan in regional processes.

In addition, in April of this year Kabul hosted the Consultative Dialogue of the Five States of Central Asia and Afghanistan. It is important that this meeting became the first multilateral event of such a format in the Afghan capital since 2021, and demonstrated the aspiration of the parties towards closer involvement of Afghanistan in regional processes.

The practice of recent years shows that the prolonged isolation of Afghanistan does not contribute to strengthening regional security. On the contrary, the pragmatic course of the states of Central Asia, providing for the consistent involvement of Kabul in regional trade and economic, transport, energy, and infrastructure projects, will retain its significance as one of the key directions of the regional agenda, contributing to the strengthening of stability and to the development of the entire region.

All the more so since the situation in Afghanistan today differs markedly from the period of foreign military presence. According to World Bank assessments, the economy of Afghanistan continues to demonstrate limited growth. The country's real GDP is estimated at approximately 4.8 per cent. We see that there is positive dynamics.

I recently had occasion to take part in the expert dialogue "Central Asia–Afghanistan", which took place in Kabul. I can confirm that alongside the problems that persist in the country, preconditions are taking shape for further stabilization and development.

We are convinced that the further involvement of Afghanistan in regional processes answers the interests not only of the states of Central Asia, but of the whole of Eurasia.

Esteemed participants,

If we speak of the regional security architecture of Central Asia, it is important to understand that it has a multi-level and multi-component character.

While developing their own mechanisms of interaction, the states of Central Asia are simultaneously expanding cooperation with external partners, both at the bilateral level and within the framework of multilateral institutions.

Of particular significance for the states of Central Asia is cooperation in the "Central Asia Plus" format, which already today encompasses practically all key centers of power, including extra regional partners. Going forward, these formats will develop consistently in interaction with existing partners, including Russia, the PRC, the countries of the EU, and the USA, and will also expand through new platforms of cooperation with the countries of Northern Europe, the United Kingdom, Türkiye, and other interested states. Such an approach reflects the multi-vector foreign policy of the region's states and corresponds to the logic of the formation of a more polycentric world order.

A particular place in this palette is traditionally occupied by Russia. Today Russia and four states of Central Asia are bound by allied relations, while with Turkmenistan a strategic partnership is maintained. The security of Central Asia answers the interests not only of the states of the region, but also of the Russian Federation, since stability in the region directly affects the situation on its southern frontiers.

At present, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are members of the CSTO. At the same time, the system of regional security is not confined exclusively to CSTO mechanisms.

The example of Uzbekistan is instructive. Our country consistently and actively develops bilateral cooperation with Russia along the lines of the defense ministries, law enforcement bodies, and special services.

Confirmation of this was the signing on 22 January 2025 of the Plan of Cooperation between the Defense Ministries of Uzbekistan and Russia for 2025, as well as the Program of Strategic Partnership in the Military Sphere for 2026–2030.

Alongside this, multilateral platforms continue to play an important role, above all the CIS and the SCO, ensuring the coordination of efforts in countering terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, and other transnational threats.

At the same time, the states of the region interact with other international partners. China participates in ensuring regional stability both through SCO mechanisms and by means of bilateral cooperation. The European Union implements programs of assistance in border management and countering drug trafficking. The United States provides support for projects in the sphere of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, export control, and strengthening the capacity of customs services. An important role is also played by the UN, the OSCE, CICA, and specialized international structures.

Thus, the security of Central Asia is ensured not by any single mechanism, but by an aggregate of mutually complementary regional, Eurasian, and global formats of cooperation.

It is telling that the efforts of the region's states to strengthen cooperation are receiving broad international support. Evidence of this was the adoption in May of this year of the UN General Assembly resolution on Central Asia — "Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Economic Integration for Sustainable Development in the Central Asian Region."

This speaks to the growing recognition of Central Asia as an independent and responsible participant in the formation of a more resilient and inclusive security architecture in the Eurasian space.

Esteemed experts,

At the same time, despite the progress achieved, Central Asia continues to face a number of long-term challenges that will largely determine the regional agenda in the coming decades.

One of the most serious remains the shortage of water resources. According to World Bank data, already today more than 37 million people in the region live in areas with a high level of water stress, and by 2050 their number may reach 75 million.

No less important a challenge remains transport and logistics constraints, especially for landlocked states. Overcoming them is of key significance for expanding trade, attracting investment, and increasing the connectivity of the region.

Particular relevance is acquired by the question of the formation of regional identity. Its strengthening presupposes the development of a sense of belonging to a single regional space while preserving the national distinctiveness of the region's states. Under these conditions, ever greater significance will be acquired by questions of forming common regional values and meanings, increasing the mutual awareness of the societies of the countries of Central Asia, and overcoming the barriers that persist in public perceptions of the region.

Esteemed friends,

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that the experience of Central Asia in recent years convincingly shows that security cannot be ensured exclusively by means of military-political instruments or external guarantees. Its foundation is formed by trust, political will, and the capacity of states to take account of one another's interests and to respond jointly to common challenges.

The experience and practice of the countries of Central Asia demonstrate that even under conditions of high international turbulence, it is possible to form a space of stability based on dialogue, good-neighborliness, and mutual responsibility. This experience is of interest not only for our region, but also for the wider Eurasian space.

At the same time, in speaking of the future of Eurasian security, one cannot but pose several questions:

— Will the states of Eurasia succeed in forming an inclusive, indivisible, and equitable system of security, capable of taking account of the interests of all participants and resting on the principles of sovereign choice, mutual respect, and cooperation?

— Will the continent not become a space of competing geopolitical projects, where the security of some states is achieved at the expense of the security of others?

— Can the successful experience of the countries of Central Asia be applied across the whole of the Eurasian space?

The shape of the future Eurasian security architecture will largely depend on the answers to these questions.

Thank you for your attention.